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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

'IE

STl\TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

RfCHARD H. NICKLES and
K. NICKLES,

Case No. 18666

'~RGARET

Defendants-Appellants

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants, Richard H. Nickles and Margaret K.
:Hckles, appeal from the conviction and judgment of Aggravated
~rson,

a felony in the Second Degree, and Insurance Fraud, a

'elony in the Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
?<>ter F.

Leary presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellants, Richard H. Nickles and Margaret K.
were tried and convicted of Aggravated Arson, a

~ickles,

o~cond

Felony,

Degree Felony, and Insurance Fraud, a Second Degree
in a trial from June 7, through June 22, 1982.

·~~ellant

Richard H. Nickles was sentenced to the indeterminate

" c~ of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and
.·:0s

fined $10,

,rson.

ooo

2cc

pr-ovided by law for the crime of ll.ggravated

He was sentenced to the indeterminate term of not less than

one year nor more than fifteen years and was fined $10,000
as provided by law for the crime of Insurance Fraud.
sentences were to run concurrently.

The

Appellant Margaret K.

Nickles was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years and was fined
$5,000 as provided by law for the crime oc Aggravated
Arson.

She was sentenced to the indeterminate term of not

less than one year nor more than fifteen years as provided by
law for the crime of Insurance Fraud.
run concurrently.

The sentences were to

Her sentences were suspended upon serving

six months in the Salt Lake County Jail and an indeterminate
period of probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment rendered
by the court below or, in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 30, 1980, at about 1:20 a.m., there was an
explosion followed by a fire at the home of the appellants,
Richard and Margaret Nickles (T. 73).

The Nickles resided at

4448 Crest Oak Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.
No members of the Nickles family were home at the time.
Margaret Nickles and the two Nickles daughters, Kimberly and
Diana, had driven to California on October 27, 1980, to visi'
friends and relatives (T. 1637, 1639, 2005).

Richard Nickles

stayed in Salt Lake City to attend to business (T. 279) and
then flew to California on the morning of October 29, 1980.

-2-

111s

ciirport parking sticker was marked 10:35 a.m.

(T. 1906).

rrc flew instead of driving to California because his bad

Lack made it painful for him to sit for long periods (T. 278,

iG4J-42).

Richard Nickles attended business meetings in Los

Angeles on October 29 and 30 (T. 1638) and then flew to Santa
Maria, Calfironia, where he was later joined by his family.
The Nickles made typical preparations prior to their
dc0arture.

A neighbor boy, David Dickert, was asked to care

for their cat (T. 153).

Richard Nickles also offered the

Dickerts a casserole that Margaret did not want to leave
in the refrigerator while they were gone (T. 111).

David

picked it up from the flower box outside the front door (T. 155).
Many lights were on in the house the evening prior to Richard
Mickles' departure

(T. 113).

John Minichino of the local arm of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) called Richard Nickles
in

California to notify him of the fire on the evening of

October 30 before the rest of the family had arrived in
Santa Maria (T.

531).

Richard Nickles'

immediate response

was to inquire if anyone had been hurt (T. 511).
expressed anger at the situation (T. 532).

He also

Upon being told

of the fire, Margaret Nickles' reaction was tears and
uncertainty (T. 1782).
~''"

"'lltire family

The experience was devastating to

(T. 1654).

The entire family began the drive back to Salt Lake
:ity together the following day (T. 1641).

They arrived in

Salt Lake City on November 2 around 12:30 a.m.
-3-
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other l:Tclld

1123) .

• r.crs •3ble upon which a lamp was situated prior to the
Bilttalion Chief John
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(T. 629).

·.·1c1nit~·

G~

where

the

At the trial the appellants

parsons table identical to the one th3t r.ad 'Jeer·.

d•1-:.Ji a
'

fo~nd

~ire

ngr1cht testified that he

rcmu1ns of something red in the
was

c;.

in the downstairs bedroom.
that it was composed of st'/rene plastic,

:1Ld

~l)Und

·h.~

11eltcd milteri.:il in and around the "device"

(T.

ident:..c,1~

: ':2'01

'l·'•rr·d tra'' \vas absolutely flat, without c,·.·ider.ce of
•r '"'idls

(T.

1113-14).

rndependent tests were conducted or. the st:r-rene t:lJst1c
It was found that it is flammable and burns at atout
l

·1

· t. r.

a test performed ilt trial,
the plastic table

(T.

it was shown thilt acetoc.c·

1861-62).

Experts further

that a 100 watt light bulb will reach an exterior
264° to 266° F (T.
'··s': he perfor:-:ied,

1500).

it took

1

A chemist

tcst1~1ed

100 w;1tt light bult t·,.;o

: ·teen minutes to :-:ielt through an identical parsor.s
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when placed in acetone, leaving strands of material

(T. l 'i73).

Acetone further discolored the linings of the suitcases (T
32, 1573).

!'

Acetone also dissolved part of the exterior 1 1 :.rn··

of the suitcases and the plastic tray contained in the

rnake-u~

bag (T. 1542-43, 1571). In the opinion of a chemist, David Osbc:
the suitcase lining had never been exposed to acetone (T. 1''51
He testified that acetone, caught in bubbles in contact glue,
could be the source of the acetone found in the lining IT. EJ"
The experts further testified that acetone is a component o'.
wood that is released when the wood burns (T. 1026, 1539).
Carpet samples from the Nickles' home were also anal ·cc.
The State's expert testified that this finding was more cornrle•
than the analysis of the suitcase lining (T.

962).

He found

that there was a simply compounded mixture of hydrocarbons
(Id.)

This indicated the presence of solvents of the sane

type (T. 963).

Hydrocarbons are a byproduct of burning wood

(T. 1043) but, according to this expert, these results were
not consistent with just burni11g wood (T. 1045).

However, r.c

test was conducted actually burning the carpet exhibit (Id.).
The defense expert testified that he conducted tests which
found several substances:

styrene, toluene, and possibly

methyl styrene, but no acetone (T. 1541).

The toluene found

would be a normal vapor in a fire and the styrene would exist
if there were styrene plastics in the home (T. 1542).
The Nickles home was listed for sale at the time o:
the fire.

It was listed from May 15, 1980 to Septembe1· l9, 1 93 ·

(T. 349), and again in early October of 1980 (T.

-8-

305).

The

1 15 1

,nq

· 11,

,

11,,,J

, ""

·1t

c d

the' time of the fire was for $239,000 (T. 321).

csL1tc agent at the time of the fire, Alice Blair,
tu try to sell the house.

The Nickles had declined

'-~ h,,ld an open house when Margaret's parents visited

(T. 328)

and asked that the house not be shown while they were in Cal, fornia

(T.

311).

~he

Nickles were not destitute at the time of the fire

despite a $75,000 loan with a six-month balloon (T. 433).
:,lcirqctret :lickles testified to assets of the family besides
their business
ic1

(T. 1951).

I-,ugust of 1980

(T.

The short-term loan was obtained

432-33).

One payment was made on it

IT.

438).

The loan officer knew that the Nickles intended to

~ay

back the loan by the sale of the house (T. 444-45).

Subsequently,

in late

Octobe~

the Nickles planned to pay off

entire loan with new credit they believed they could

th~

obtain (T.

445-57,

1946).

'.hie nPw arrangement

(T.

The loan officer was advised of
446).

No mortgage payments were

by the Nickles after the fire because of a shortage of

~ade

,:ash flow due to living expenses incurred .(T. 1960).
however,

~~re,
~r~

They

in constant contact with the loan officer and

1u1te concerned about the situation (T. 452).
The Nickles had insurance coverage in force on their

'11J:".e ind

•ir1

'.1urciarct

the contents of their home at the time of the fire.
Nickles'

request in January of 1980, the insurance

•rage had been increased due to the remodeling of the house
(T

c,n

736).
chp

The limits at the time of the fire were $268,000

house with $134,000 on personal property (T. 661).

-9-

The

policy had increased from $250,000 to $268,000 due to
in inflation factor

(T.

The Nickles had always

726).

a "cadillac" insurance policy on their home

(T.

~

bui~t

maint _•,·._

716)

The "'

provided coverage for a full year with payment due each

Se~tP·

After only a brief lapse because he forgot to pay the bill, "i::
Nickles submitted the premium due in September of 1980

IT.

l).;

The insurance coverage also included a $3,800 fur rider and a
$7,280 silver rider

(T.

658).

The statement of proof of loss was submitted to Great
American Insurance on December 30, 1980

(T.

1208).

Al thougn

Richard Nickles had requested additional time to prepare thE
statement because of the complexity of the information, the
emotional trauma, the necessity of finding other accommodat1crs
(T. 1845), and lack of records available to the appellants
(T. 1850), the insurance company refused to grant an oral ext2:,,_of time

('I.

694).

Instead,

they indicated that the Nickles wee.·

have to apply for an ex tens ion

( T.

6 9 5) .

The proof o:' 10ss

VIC.S

submitted under difficult and emotionally trying circumstances
The appellants did their best to correctly docu:nenc the.
losses.

Only a few receipts could be found where the busir.ess

account had been involved
fire.

(T.

1930-31).

The rest were lost '

The appellants were told to utilize replacement costs • 3 :·

than actual cash value on their personal property in the ~·r00'. .loss (T. 723).

The appellants informed the insurance compari,

l

the column marked "source" on the proof of loss was actu.Jll·_
place where they had obtained the rerlacement costs crnd no'
source of purchase

(T.

1179,

1849).

A witness

~ram

HJrbara

Interiors verified that the Nickles had contacted them (T. l~G'
-10-

:;e, r.1]
t Ju

U1'

of

the'/ do not

1

:"

·s (T.
i1•_ic1t c

0

'ij

businesses, including the art appraiser, admitted

l ilS,

r p<cople,

i1

1361,

record of the telephone calls to ask
1397).

The proof of loss was prepared by

includin'i familj members and friends

i:kles lu c:omplete it (T. 18 4 7) .
hundL~d

(T. 252,

took two to three weeks of full-time work by Margaret

It

.J 71

r ·c•cp

~·<l•JPS

The claim was

(T.

2 52) '

The proof of loss was some two

with over 1700 items listed (T. 1167).

for $233' 350. 29 (T. G73).

This was in line with

tne bid obtained to replace the structure of $231,192.31 (T. 1911)
3nd less than the total coverage.
1

T.

fi 76) .

The silver claimed was $12,876

Because of the manner and means by which it was prepared

and uecause of the time constraints, the appellants acknowledged
that there could, in fact, be errors despite their attempts to
av0id them

(T.

1847).

one of the major items contained in the proof of loss was
the claim for silverware.

The arson personnel purportedly examined

thE debris shovelful by shovelful looking for silver.

Chief

Unqricht testified that melted silver should have been in the
rccmains

(';'.

548).

He further testified that fire personnel were

very thorough and that it would not be possible to miss more than
an isolated piece of silverware in the extensive search that was
performed
.. ~r·

(T.

1826-27).

sul.:s1°CJuently found

,JishPs

(T.

However, over fifty pieces of silverware
(T. 1650), together with trays, bowls and

1851).

·.umerous witnesses testified

not only to the extensive

'"' dc·l1n'1 that had been done in the Nickles home.
'" 1 Sl'cn

Their neighbor

sterling silver flatware, bowls, a tea set, and candelabra

-11-

within six months of the fire

(T. 127-28, 146).

She also

verified that there were new draperies within three months
of the fire

(T. 130).

A friend of the Nickles, Lynette:,.,,:,

as well as Margaret Nickles described the extensive remodel1co
that had been done in the home.

This included new appliances,

fixtures, and carpeting in the kitchen (T. 243, 1823-24);

l~·: __

recarpeting and refurnishing the family room (T. 1825-26); 2r.·c
new draperies throughout the home (T. 242, 1826).

These fl.lee.:·.

were seen by Lynette Daniel the Sunday prior to the Thursda;
fire (T. 260-61).

The furnishings in the home were described

as a "quality decor" and "elegant" by the loan officer on th•
$75,000 loan

(T. 469).

The draperies were further verified:·

the son of the woman who made them; he hung them in the 'J1cL2,
residence (T. 1712).

Both he and his wife also verified thac

there were two special paintings in the home (T. 1738,

17~9-5C1.

At trial the State claimed that many of the belonqifcs
claimed by the Nickles on the proof of loss either did not
exist or did not exist in the quality claimed by the Nickles.
These claims centered on the silver, the furs, the paintincs,
designer jeans, and shoes.
accounted for

In fact, much of the silver was

(T. 1850) with the exception of six place sett:C:'

the presence of which is unknown at this time.

Chief Ung re ·r.:

belatedly admitted that insurance personnel had found the
remains of fur and given those to him (T. 2040).

The paint 1r..c.

claimed by the Nickles were valued at $4,000 each on th,:· p.·c-

-12-

loss

<'."

'rhis w~s the value only of a copy, not the original
'etdl items, s11ch cis one of the paintings (T. 1943),

(T

t:cr,

3

(T.

1864), left a protected area visible to the

,csti'J"tors, but the actual item was missing.
6

claim for designer jeans (T. 1787).

There was never a

Chief Ungricht testified

Lhat his investigators never counted the remains of the shoes

t_h,1t were fcund

(T. 594).

Lynette Daniel verified that Kim

Nickles had about fifty pairs of shoes, Diana about twenty
2airs, and 'largaret about forty pairs (T. 281-82).
Subsequent to the judgment, which was entered in
August 1982,
appellants'

~nd

subsequent to the f1l1ng of an appeal, the

case was remanded from this Court to the Third

Judicial District Court for a supplemental hearing on the issue
of prosecutor1al misconduct.
bi'

The remand was stipulated to

IJoth the appellants and the State.

o:i April 1 and 7,
r~~

trial

1983,

The proceeding occurred

before the Honorable James F. Sawaya.

judge, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, recused himself

from hearing this supplemental proceeding.

1

The basis for the

!nmacd and the appellants' subsequent motion for a new trial
was Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen's involvement
~1t:h

a

~rivate

arson investigation company at the same time

,Judcv L<>a1 y had presided over a motion to recuse the County

0 ·t 1·e~,·; Office and Deputy County Attorney Michael Christensen
1•1rally in another arson case, State v. Woods, Case No.

resulting in an order prohibiting Mr. Christensen
'.urther prosecuting that case.
See order dated November 12,
118~ in the above-cited case.

_;J2-~9J,
.LGG

-13-

as he prosecuted arson cases,

including tho appellants',

the County Attorney's office.
Early in 1981 the private cirson firm got unJ, r

Inc.,

March 31, 1981

(AFI)

(Supp. T.

40).

2

were Michael Christensen, his wife Virginici

The incorporator(both

with the County Attorney's office then and now),
James Ashby,

office

an investigator for

t~c

County

attor~~;s

and

Attorne~·is

The filing letter was sent on stationer;

(Id.)

a~

Mr. Christensen's as a private attorney with Suite C222
Metropolitan Hall of Justice listed as an address and

1-.1'.:.l:

two telephone numbers, one of which was the old Count·; ,-,tt:Jr-.·
number

(Supp. T.

39-42).

The business was started because

the County Attorney's arson investigators had been advised "h ·
their jobs as investigators might terminate in June 1381
(Supp. T.

43) .

.".FI ;:;erformed eight in•1estigations
March of 1981,

(Supp. T.

they investigated both the Challis,

theater fire and a fire in Paul,
in both these cases

(Supp.

T.

Idaho.

49).

~1r.

471.

Idaho

Jim Ashb'/ was con L1 1_ :

Christcnsc:1

~~s

for the reports by AFI on these two fire invest inat1ons
T.

47-~8).

~2:.l

(Sup1 ·

The next in•f(cstigat1on was in l'iorL:rnd, 1-:-,·cr:i1rg,

May or July 1981

(Supp. T.

50).

Company hired him for the \-iorland fire arid :.1r. c_'hrist .. 11scn

2.
Citations to the su;:;plemental hecirln<j nrder1"l b-,· t:11s -will be cited as Supp. T.

-H-

1

od AFI again received payment for their work (Supp. T. 51).

N·

A~hby

~end~r.

was again retained on an investigation of a fire in

Wyoming.

In September 1981, AFI investigated a book

store fire in Boise, Idaho and a residential fire in Cuna,
.dciho (Supp. T.

53-54).

Also in the fall of 1981 the Farmers

Horne Insurance Company group retained AFI to take photographs
-• fire scenes in Panguitch and Grantsville, Utah (Supp. T. 55-56).
~s
~esti:ied

a result of the Cuna, Idaho, investigation, Mr. Christensen
as an expert in February of 1982 (Supp. T. 54).

Part

of his qualifying credentials was his experience as a deputy
county attorney

(Supp. T. 54-55).

Mr. Ashby, who participated

in the investigation of the appellants' case (Supp. T. 76-77),
also used his credentials as an investigator for the County
.;ttorney's office to obtain work for AFI (Supp. T. 82-83).

Once

;rr•s existence was brought to the attention of County Attorney
Ted Cannon, Mr. Christensen was notified to cease his private
irvestigations in May or June of 1981 (Supp. T. 74-75).
During about a four-year period that overlapped with
;?I's existence, Mr. Christensen prosecuted about nine arson
a~d insurance

I Suri·. T.

fraud cases with the County Attorney's Office

20).

he triod Edward

In 1979, he tried Ray Albert Long.

s.

In 1980,

Dronzank. rhe Nickles were prosecuted in

'une 1982 and John Troy was prosecuted in August 1982.
~1rK1n was prosecuted in January or February 1983.

Tracy

He also

rr1ad the Busboom case in the latter part of 1981 (Supp. T.
~·J-.)11).

i\t the time of the hearing, the Tony Beck automobile

-15-
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···:::·_·~···

ccu:d

here.

\~xr~·los1or.

and :ire c:.ccurrcd

-1 -:-

i;-.

the ~~1ck~2s hc~,c.

There is no evidence that the bulb was set
device.

as a

u~

The State's own witness performed a test with a [,ulL

and acetone where it was ignited in ten to twenty minutes,
sixteen hours later (T. 1123).

An expert defense witness

testified that the bulb would have melted through the tabl0
on its own in two hours and fifteen minutes (T. 1501).

Thus,

even if there were no acetone present, there would have been
a hole through the table if that bulb had been left burning
Richard Nickles left the house.
Defense expert, David Osborne, tested both the so-cal>
device and the table.
styrene (T. 1525).

He found that they were both primarily

There was no evidence of another substance

in the device that would indicate the presence of some type o!
paint tray as theorized by the State.
of an accelerant in the device.

There was also no evldec.:

The so-called tray was comple:'

flat on the de•1ice without any indication that there were edycs
that would have formed a tray (T. 1113-13). Acetone on the tac'..
itself would have dissolved the table (T. 1861-62).

There was

simply no evidence that the lamp had been sitting in any type
acetone.

In fact, there was nothing inconsistent with a bulb

sitting on a table with crossword puzzles nearby.

One of the

State's own investigators testified that he saw some red matec::
nearby in the bedroom that was probably the shade that had
originally been on the lamp (T. 629).
Moreover, there was no evidence that acetone was userl
an accelerant.

There was inconsistent testimony on the

so-called pour patterns with State witnesses saying there
were trailers in the house and at the s2111e time saying that
-18-

cllc photographs depicted wavy lines which were not evidence
r

trctilcers

(T.

631, 913).

No acetone was detected in the

If acetone had been placed on the parsons
-,uJe, tests demonstrated that it would have dissolved the
and there would have been a hole in it.

t~ble

An incredible

amount of acetone would have been necessary to cause the
explosion, anywhere from 450 gallons up to 2,250 gallons
(T. 1888).

These amounts clearly could not have entered the house
in the suitcases that the State so carefully preserved,
believing that they had been the vehicle for bringing acetone
in the house.

First of all, they could not have contained

the amount that would have been necessary to cause the explosion.
Secondly, the defense expert testified that acetone not only
would have discolored the linings of the suitcases but also
would have dissolved them, leaving mere threads (T. 1531-32,
If acetone had been on the exterior of the suitcases,

1573) .

it would have caused a softening.

chat
W3S

~ny

There was no evidence

of these effects had occurred.

Instead, the evidence

much more consistent with the theory that the acetone in

the suitcases was due to a release of the acetone caught in
Lubbles in the glue.
The cause of the explosion and fire is unknown.
cl~a1

that it was not caused as the State theorized; the

nso experts'
'••dS

It

testimony was

unre~utted

It is possible that

czii_;sed by swamp gas baclcing up into the home and creating

+_he ccxr-los ion.

However the blaze was caused, though, there was
-19-

insufficient proof as a matter of law to indicate that

ther~

had been an arson.
B. EVEN IF THE FIRE WAS ARSON, THERE 1'1AS
NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE APPELLANTS 1'1E!"l.E
RESPONSIBLE.
This Court has recently reversed convictions where
there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendants
had committed the crimes.

In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443

(Utah 1983), this Court found the evidence insufficient to
support a conviction for second degree murder.

In Petree,

the victim was last seen when her mother dropped her off at
the defendant's home.

The only other incriminating evidence

were statements the defendant made to family members and to
a girlfriend some two years later.

Id. at 444-45.

In

Petree this Court stated:
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed,
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
Id. at 444.
In State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 075

(Utah. 1983), t!ois

Court reversed a conviction in an arson case based upon the
insufficiency of the evidence.

In Linden, black plastic

cans found at the scene were later traced to Checker Auto
Parts.

The clerk at Checker remembered selling the cans to

two men, one older and one younger.

Although the younger

was later identified as the codefendant, there was insufficient
evidence to link the defendant with the sale or the arson. Id.

-20-

In this case, even if the explosion and fire at the
•! 1 ,:kles'

hone were caused by arson, the State failed to prove

that the appellants were the persons responsible.

No one

saw anyone set up a device or pour any acetone in the home.
The State claims that the lights in the house were on prior
to Richard Nickles' departure because he was pouring acetone.
This is total speculation.
that he was packing.

The only reasonable conclusion is

The evidence clearly established that

Richard Nickles did, in fact,

fly out of Salt Lake to Los

Angeles the morning of the 29th of October.

It is obvious

that he would have needed to pack the night before.

Moreover,

the evidence established that Richard Nickles was gone sixteen
hours prior to the explosion at his home (T. 1906).

There

is no evidence that he had ever purchased large quantities of
acetone or set up any kind of device.

There was, further, no

evidence presented by the State that any of his actions could
h~ve

caused a fire sixteen hours later.

As noted in the

previous section, under the State's theory of the cause of
the fire, it would have to have been set much more recently
than sixteen hours prior to the blaze.
Moreover, the evidence established that Margaret
~ickles

had left for California on October 27 with her
There was no evidence to indicate that she was

~resent in Salt Lake city, or in her home, at any time within

forty-eight hours of the fire.
~ccepted

Thus, even if the jury had

the State's theory that Richard Nickles had set some

kind of a device, there was absolutely no evidence that

-21-

'.·: l

·-:

r :

,•

"" :~ •

• •

+--'

_1 ';_-

S

1

i

r. ':

•

t-,

~ 1-

,: '

J

CCiU}

• 1 -

~-

s

...

·... '

.-

:-:

-L:s

r·;.-;.=" t
t t·.1

th,lt

,n 1 -

·~

t

:

S\'

........

th

'; :cJ.: lt_'S h.:. l.
1•

r:: c d

1··1·1

.1:.=: 1 ~- '.J ....

clCj•

1

I~

:--tC'

t

l ~.

::;1

loLtn ·... 1th a
1

~• .J.d

1

_I>

l

,l/i

t S

l }

1s

3SSC'tS

it

~h.

f ur':::h·,!.·

on

tru~'

th~it

!I'd

~-ht

1 l_C1'

•. L

,.

,1s

LJ~1llon

it

.l

t~ll_'

a :_us::--.. _ '2·--

...._-

-:':._a .._·_:

~1

••

r sor..

l

I·~ ~

l >

S

::.·'-""'::_-

.\''

~I·_·

:._

.
-

~-

l

1--- +~

l.

'

li' 1

l )
. :r-.

I_'}

I

:-'. t•_·rtdL·d

lt

.'ht_-,._,

.

•

"he :.:: t at

·r. t

l'

. 1).:()

-~'

1::J !-.ad

i l

,-! ,

u''

>.

St.J.t(_' ':.

,, f~-\'nsc

l 2·

is the u.ccuscd' s

t:)

:..ntc::~

the doing of the
-.,;35

done v,rith the

48 '

i);

16 3 p. 2 d 3 ·l 2

3C~

s~ccif1c

_it th·-.:

( l 'l 4 s)

docs not r31sc

had always had a

in fact

,-c3s<· 31-ter

I ·c
~-l~_:_-,_

~

~-~s~~~~:~~

:=lt2tc ·:.

;-;1tt.:.:: ... :-.:.::,

~3d

3dcquate,

not

cxccss1·:~,

their policy

"cadillac"

covc~ed

actual

insurJ.;-;ce:
en~~~

::cl.:.c~

not

1~d

insura~c0

cc·.·ercd

they had completed extcnsi·:e rcciorlel1:cc~ ~,c

This increase was

736).

ef~cct1\·e

al~ost

J.

re tr.c :ire.

""er1:10d b~'
1,

-!~

.

The amount of

_,r

Id.

on their home.
~Jicklcs

. 71G),

~ :~

to dc:r.:=.uC..

i~te:--:~

J.iit·~:-:t."

The 2ppellants in tl11s CJ.SC
sur3~cc

~82,

dc:rJ.1.:d."

·;'!1l' person ::-iust wet \-Jlth the SC'cc1:1,..:

il

--~:..z.

cl.=ii'.11.

~uranc,,

···

G::..11,_)tc,

4,;9,
~he

friends and farnil~' of tr.c ::icklf;s

1712,

1733,

(':'.

lJG,

::::42-~2,

1749-50).

proof of loss filed indicated no intent tc de!raud

.~ur~ncc

~7on

coMpany.

lines of items

thcr~ ~1~ht
1:;_-,,,1t

The claim which consisted of some

dc.J.l

o:

~:as

:J:

cxtcnsi·:e.

be errors ~here they co~plcted the c:31~

stress ·..;1thout J.n·/ _J_-:cor:1s and

-23-

ir-,

a ·:e~~·

short time (T. 1654, 1347).
were covered for replacement costs or not,

the)' wc·r·· t0lcJ [,"

an insurance agent to list the replacement costs

IT.

723).

The appellants explained to the insurance company that

th~

source listed on the insurance claim was the source of thP
replacement costs and not the source of purchase (T.
1849).

1179,

The State repeatedly tried to prejudice the jur:,- b1·

presenting witnesses who testified that the Nickles did not,
in fact, buy the items at the store.

(See testirnon:,- of nine

witnesses, beginning at T. 1251, 1321, 1332, 1336, 1349, lJS".
1370' 1392' 1489).

None of the major items questioned by the State
a theory of insurance fraud.

su~pc

-

The State emphasized that the

sterling silver claimed by the Nickles had not been found in
the home and, yet, evidence was presented that the Nickles d1
in fact,

have sterling silver flatware and that six place

settings of it were found safe in a floor vault
1648).

Many other pieces of silverware (T.

trays (T. 1351) were subsequently found.

(T.

1650)

127-28, Jj•:

and bowls a:.c

Where these were

~1ss

by the State's investigators, it is certainl:,- possible that
were missed as well.

c~:

The State further claimed that the Nickls'

overstated the value of two paintings.

However, the Nickl·2s c-

claimed these paintings as originals, which would have been

~c

$40,000, but claimed them as copies which were valued at SJ,

(T. 1228-29).

The existence of the paintin,3s, as well as

l!k

silver, was verified by several friends and family members I~1749-50' 127-28' 146).

Despite the State's allegations,

remains of furs that were given to the fire personnel
-24-

t~ere

IT. c0401.

;;t,1tc'

s investigators failed to count the remains of the shoes

,1ind

and thus raised mere speculation as to whether, in

•,ct,

the number of shoes was accurate.

:~'0's

Further, despite the

allegations that there were no designer jeans in the

there was no claim made for any designer jeans (T. 1787).

hocie,

The logical inference regarding the missing items is
that they were stolen.

The protected areas where the binoculars

and paintings were indicate that they were present when the
c1re occurred.
·,.;ee;cs le'.

1661)

The site was not secured for two to three
The destruction was quite complete; any

thefts prior to or subsequent to the fire would be difficult
'.o

detect.

If the appellants were so anxious to collect

the insurance money on a fraudulent basis, it does not make
sense that they would claim items that would be questioned.
P~rsons

with a

cri~inal

intent would not risk detection.

The

honesty, and perhaps errors, of the Nickles indicated innocence,
no• guilt,
_u~~ort

'.'.'he evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to

a verdict of guilty on the charge of insurance fraud.
POINT II
THE DEFUT'Z COU"TY ATTORCTEY 'S COt!FLICT OF
I'\'TSi<EST l'I FROSECUTI~IG APPZLLi\cITS' CASE
:·;,~?.?J\~~TS P.. ~~Lh' T?,IAL.

Pursuant to this Court's order, the appellants' case
'"- -.c._u·dcc '.'or a supplemental proceed.inc: on the issue of

'rutoria! misconduct.

The a~pellants challen0ed the propriety

rosc>cutior. ~y De~uty County P.ttorney ~~ichael Christenscr:. \·:hen
·. :2s

ir.·:o2-\'cC. \'lit~- a. ?rivate arson investigation firm 2.t the

-25-

same time as decisions in the appellants' case were made.
subsequent to the evidentiary proceeding, the appellants mov0J
for a new trial.

The court denied the motion for a new triJl

on the basis that it was untimely; the court
further ruled that it would deny the motion on the merits if
it reached them.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure §77-35-24(a) provides:
The court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
The rule further requires that a motion for a new trial be filed
within ten days after imposition of sentence or within such
further time period as the court sets during the ten-day
period.

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-24(c).
In this case, the appellants' trial counsel, James R.

Brown, was not aware of the County Attorney's conflict of
interest within the ten days of the judgment in the case in
August 1982.

In fact, he was not aware of the situation until

November 1982 (Supp. T. 14).

At that time, the Salt Lake Lcc,0'.

Defender Association had been appointed to represent the appe lla
on appeal.

Counsel acted as expeditiously as possible, filin9

both an extraordinary writ and, in the alternative, a motion

t~

remand the appeal to the District Court for supplementary ev1d2J·
tiary proceedings.

It was the belief of counsel for the appci

that a motion for a new trial was both appropriate given the 'o
and necessary in order to preserve a le0al issue for appeal.
motion was filed within ten days of the supplemental proceed1nc.

-26-

~lthough

counsel for the appellants has been unable to find

on; case law that specifically addressed the running of the time
ueriod for a new trial following a supplemental hearing, the
statute would be meaningless unless the motion is appropriate
after such an evidentiary proceeding.

This motion could not have

been raised earlier as the substance was unknown to counsel at

a prior time.

There is no remedy for defendants when this

situation arises unless the statute is construed as allowing
a timely motion after a supplemental evidentiary hearing.
The impropriety in this case had a substantial adverse
effect on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

This Court

should grant a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor's
conflict of interest in pursuing the appellants' case at the
same time that he operated a private arson investigation firm.
A prosecutor occupies a special role in our judicial
system, with a duty not only as an advocate but also as a fair
and just decision-maker.

The Utah Supreme Court recognized

this duty in Walker v. State, 624, P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981):
We have previously stated that the State
while charoed with vioorously enforcing
the laws "has a duty to not only secure
appropriate convictions, but an even higher
duty to see that justice is done."
In his
role as the state representative in criminal
matters, the prosecutor, therefore, must not
only attempt to win cases, but must see that
justice is done.
Thus, while he should prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.
(footnotes omitted).
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The California Supreme Court similarly places a
duty on a prosecutor to be fair and just in his decisions.
In People v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 561 P.?d
1164, 1171 (Cal. 1977), the Court stated:

Nor is the role of the proseuctor in this
regard simply a specialized version of the
duty of any attorney not to overstep the
bounds of permissible advocacy.
The prosecutor is a public official vested with
considerable discretionary power to decide
what crimes are to be charged and how they
are to be prosecuted.
In all his activities,
his duties are conditioned oy the fact that
he "is the representative not of any ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold ai:n
of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer."
(cites omitted).
Furthermore, Standard 1.1 of the 1971 approved draft
developed by the American Bar Association for prosecutors
specifically states:
A prosecutor should avoid the appearance
or reality of a conflict of interest with
respect to his official duties.
The Utah Legislature has likewise addressed the issue.
Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4 (4)

(1953 as amended)

states:

No public officer .
. sh al 1:
(a] ccept other
emploYT:lent which he might expect would impair
his independence of judgment in the performance
of his public duties.
Where such a conflict arises and is known before tr1Jit is appropriate to recuse the prosecutor.

In Contra Coste:,

the court refused to order the trial court to reinstate a
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,,rosccutor it had recused where an employee of the prosecutor's
-'fire was the mother of the victim in a murder case and also

witness for the State.

More recently and of most pertinence

to this case, the Third District Court (Leary, J.) ordered
the same proseuctor as in this case recused in State v. Woods,
case No. CR 82-593, under identical circumstances to those
in this matter.

(The order was attached as an exhibit to the

appellants' motion at the Supplemental Hearing).
When the duty to be impartial in fact and in appearance
is violated but not raised until after trial, the defendant is
entitled to a new trial.
~iled

In \·/alker v. State, supra, the defendant

a writ and the court granted a new trial where the prosecutor

failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.

In that

case, the prosecutor failed to divulge the fact that a man's
clothes were in the same room with a female defendant's clothes,
even though defendant's defense to the distribution charge was
"~at

~.

tho heroin found in that room belonged to another.

Bain,

575 P.2d 919

In State

(Mont. 1978), the court held prosecutorial

nisconduct entitled defendant to a new trial where "the prosecutor's
actions have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial."

Id. at 922.

In that case, the prosecutor continued to try to

ictroduce evidence of defendant's parole status even though
crdcr0d not to be the court.
In State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) this
couit reversed a conviction on theft by deception and announced
µrcsecutorial misconduct would have constituted grounds for a
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new trial if the convictions had not been reversed on other
grounds.

The appearance of impropriety is also grounds for a

trial if the convictions had not been reversed on other oround 8 .
The appearance of impropriety is also grounds for a new trial
"[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice."

Offutt~

United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
In State v. Madry, 504 P.2d 1156 (Wash. 1972), the cour'.
ordered a new trial in an assault case where the defendant
discovered, subsequent to trial, that the trial-level judges
had been investigating the hotel he owned for prostitution.
The court stated that a judge must not only be impartial,
but must also have the appearance of impartiality.

The

reaso~

is that "[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as
damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice
as would be the actual presence of bias or prejudice."
1161.

Id. at

The Madry case is directly analogous here as the ,O.B.;

standards and due process of law require that proseuctors as
well as judges maintain an appearance of impartiality.
The actual or apparent impropriety in this case entit:e'
the defendants to a new trial.

There is no way to know for sur.

what impact the dual positions Mr. Christensen held had on his
prosecutorial decisions in this case.

GAD worked with Mr.

Christensen on the appellants' case and simultaneously referrcc
business to AFI.

Mr. Christensen used his trainin<J and pos1·1.

with the County Attorney's Office as credentials for testifyi
as an expert in court on a case AFI investigated.

'.lhere the

overlap in knowledge and jobs is so great, there is at least
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an appearance of conflict.

An actual bias is supported by the

ct 3 terncnt that Mr. Stroud made in the presence of county attorney
~rsunnel that he wanted Richard Nickles in prison
rh1s apparent conflict violated the appellants'

(Supp. T.

io6)

right to a fair

trial by due process of law pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.

The appellants have a right to the apparent

and actual unbiased decisions of the prosecuting agency.

The

"substantial adverse effect" upon the appellants' right was denial
of a fair and impartial prosecution and trial.

If known prior to

trial, it is clear that the prosecutor would have been recused as
rn State v.

Woods, supra.

3

The mere fact that the impropriety was

onlj discovered post-trial should not deprive the appellants of a
remedy.

Moreover, the court has a responsibility not only to protect

the aopellants' right to a fair trial, but also to see that public
confidence is secure in the impartial administration of justice in
this state.

These two important functions could only have been
if the appellants were granted a new trial in this case.

~uaranteed

POINT III
THE TRIAL COUR'I' ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE
TELEPHONE CALL REPORTED BY EILEEN RICE.
Over objection of defense counsel, the trial court allowed
admission of a telephone conversation reportedly made by Richard
::1~k'.es

(T. 864-65).

;,•Jne call.

Eileen Eice, secretary of ATF, had taken the

The caller identified himself as Mr. Nickles.

c.
Prior to the printing of this brief, this Court reverse~ an arson
nse involving the same deputy county attorney because of his prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing statements. State v. Troy,
'=as0 I.:o. 18738 (August 29, 1984).
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Eileen Rice reported:
He was asking about some articles that had been
removed from his home and then mentioned to me
that there had been a suspected arson at his
home and that he had been suspect [sic] of it
and commented that wasn't it lucky he had been
300 miles away with the Secretary of the
Department of Energy and that he would have
needed a very long fuse or a time delay.
Then, he again came back to the fact that
these articles were missing and I asked what
was missing and he said some silverware and
other things, whole drawers full.
And I told
him I didn't believe we had them and that he
said possibly they had been removed for safekeeping.
I told him that I didn't think we had them,
but that I would have John Minichino call
when he got back to the office.
(T. 1270-71).
The trial court allowed admission of the contents of
the phone call, citing 79 A.L.R. 3d 78 (T. 865) 4 and State v.
Hess, 10 Col. App. 3d 1071, 90 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970)
as authority.

There is no Utah case law on point.

(T. 864)
This case

is distinguishable from State v. Hess and more closely related
to the factual situation of State v. Marlar, 498 P.2d 1276
(Idaho 1972).

In Hess defendants made a phone call to the

of an Arabian mare named Ingaia.

01;nc.

They expressed an interest

i~.

purchasing her, obtaining descriptions of her which they subsequently used to obtain a duplicate registration certificate.
They subsequently presented the Registry with a bill of sale
79 A.L.R. 3d 78 is, of course, a summary of law. ,\s discuc
infra, the cases require more than identification by the caller
without voice recognition by the recipient. The circumstances
surrounding who would have knowledge of the contents of the caL
is to be considered. See §20.

4.
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,·•J11taining the forged signature of the rightful owner of Ingaia .
.,'•·ndants then sold another horse purporting to be Ingaia.
·:e~~·

th0 circu,~stantial evidence surrounding the telephone call

01ntcd directly to the defendants and no one else,
cdmission of the phone call.

1t

justifying

They had obtained information which

thee· used in the fraudulent sale.
~iven

In

The information had not been

to anyone else, nor was it a matter of public knowledge.

'•das quite clear in Hess the defendants made use of the

particular knowledge they had acquired during the telephone
coriverscttion.
State v. Marlar, supra, presents a different factual
situation, more in line with the present case.

In Marlar, the

court admitted an alleged telephone conversation between the
apoellant and the witness Higgins.
r~ut

Higgins in the morgue.

The caller threatened to

The phone call was admitted over

counsel's objection to improper authentication.

The court

announced the general rule relating to admission of the
suLstance of a phone call:
The admissibility of telephone conversations
is governed by the same rules of evidence which
govern the admission of oral statements made in
face-to-face conversations, except that the
party against whom the conversation is sought
to be used must ordinarily be identified.
29
i\m. Jr. 2d Evid., §380, p. 431 (1967).
(Emphasis
added).
See Tonkin-Clark Realty Co. v. Hedges,
24 Idaho 304, 133 P. 669 (1913) .
• J. at

1280.

The most reliable means of identification is voice

_:_d('nt1:=ication.

Id.

\'ithout voice identification, the general rule is that
"m~re

statement of his identity by the caller is insufficient
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proof of the caller's identity."

Id. at 1281, citi:1" (_'•ilL,:tJc

v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 136 Tex.
771

263, 150 S.i-J.

2d

(Tex. App. 1941); McCormick, Law of Evidence, .J05-0G

(lO<J).

If only the named caller has knowledge of the conversational
contents, the phone call may be admissible.

Id. Oregon has cic1·,·

a de minimus rule pertaining to circumstantial identificaticn.
State v. Glisan, 2 Or. App.

314, 465 P.2d 253

(1970).

The coc:--

in State v. Marlar took a more cautious approcich, adopting a
"clecirly corroborative" test regardinc; the admissibility of a
phone call.

The court considered clear identification of the

caller, the subject matter of the conversation, and who woulc1
have knowledge of facts reported in the conversation.
In this case, Eileen Rice oould not identify Pichard
The :; icklcs'

Nickles' voice, nor did she place the phone call.
number was published in the phone book.

Newspapers and other

media reported information on the Nickles being out of town
the time of the fire,
kno11ledge (T. 652).

2l

thereby making that fact a matter of pub!:
The contents of the phone call were, thcr

not particular knowledge only Richcird Nickles 11ould r.avc.

--r~

could have identified himself as Richard Nickles and conveyed t:
same information to !·Is. Rice.

Where Eileen Rice was unable to

identify the voice or any particular mannerisms and the content'
of the phone call were a matter of public knowledac, admissior
of the phone call should have been
evidence as in State v. :·larlar,
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d<~nied.

~,

C:..:-\f,

Tl:ere 1vas r.o c•: -:
~-;t3tc

\'.

Hess,

~

POINT IV
i\PPELLANTS WERE DEllIED !1 FAIR TRIAL BY
THE INDIVIDUAL AND CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
l\LLOWING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
A.

IRRELEVANT AND IMr·:ATERIAL EVIDENCE

During the trial,

irrelevant or immaterial testimony was

allowed into evidence over the objection of defense counsel.
r1rst, a neighbor of the Nickles testified that the Nickles'

home had lights on in several rooms at 3:00 a.m. on the night prior
to Pichard Nickles' departure for California.
only that lights were on.

The neighbor saw

She saw no movements or any signs of

dctivity in the Nickles' home (T. 112-14).

Second, the neighbor

further testified over objection that she sent her son over to
the Nickles to obtain a casserole which was offered to her by
Pichard Nickles

(T. 114).

Third, an insurance agent was allowed

t·o testify regarding policy coverage of a family room and a twocdr garage if the home were rebuilt (T. 660).

The Nickles had

converted their garage into a family room and had no garage on
the home.

No claim for a garage was made in the insurance claim.

Fourth, although sustaining one objection (T. 1096), the Court
r0~eatedly permitted the introduction of testimony regarding

'ccelerants other than acetone (T. 1092, 1101).

Fifth, the State

•Os able to present testimony regarding the proximity of the
·:1

lcs'

1stl/,

business to Deseret Industries, a thrift store (T. 1690)
the State \vas permitted to ask Leo Thorup, the building

~lthough defense counsel did not raise the objection ~ntil
1tt0r the witness had answered, we urge the Court to consider
chesc objections where there was no subsequent aili~onishment of
the jury to disregard inadmissible evidence.
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5

contractor who prepared a bid for replacement o[ the

:iickl~s'

home, if his bid included estimates of building the sume

h~m~

in Arizona (T. 1922).
Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at
the time of the trial defined relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the existcnc
of any material fact."

Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence i:

effect at the time of the trial stated that the court had
to exclude evidence if the "probative value [was]

discr~:

substantiall~

outweighed by the risk that its admission [would] ... (b)

create

substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues
or of misleading the jury ... "
There must be an abuse of discretion to reverse a trial
court's admission of evidence.
565 P.2d 1139

(Utah 1977).

r~artin

v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,

The ;:>rinciples of two Utah cases

a~c

applicable here, even though each involved the trial court's
exclusion of evidence.
In Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
1977)

565 P.2d 1139 (Utah

this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude

immaterial evidence on ·>'leather conditions at the airport which
was twenty miles from the scene of the plaintiff's fall on an
icy

sidewalk.

In so doing, this Court stated " [ t] he weather

report ... had very little, if any, probative value and it could
have created a substantial risk of confusing the issues."

Id.

at 1141.
More recently, in Reiser v. Lehner, 641 P.2d 93

(Utah

1982), this Court affirmed the exclusion of possible neglic:cncc

-36-

1n
1

Fh antibody testing in a medical malpractice case for harm

riH1ng from an amniocentesis test.

The trial court had

>:eluded the information because the Rh sensitivity did not
cJuse the injury and any negligence by the doctors in
diagnosis and treatment of the sensitivity was potentially
prejudicial to the determination of medical negligence in
causing the injuries suffered.

Id. at 96-97.

In this case, each admission as well as their cumulative
erfect constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
~one

of the testimony outlined here was relevant.

It was

presented by the State solely for its prejudicial impact.
No material fact was advanced by the admission of testinony
regarding the lights being on in the Nickles' home the night
before the fire or the casserole being placed on a flower box
outside.

The State was speculating that Richard Nickles was

pouring acetone in his home at that time.

However, unrefuted

testimony demonstrated that, if acetone was used, it had to
have been poured much more recently that twenty-four hours
before the explosion or there must have been an unbelievable
amount of the substance in the home (T. 1888-89).
There were repeated attempts to prejudice the jury's
·;iew of the Nickles' motives with irrelevant evidence.

no probative value to either the testimony regarding coverage

~~s

,,f

There

il

t1vo-car 0arage as well as a family room or the testimony

,,het_hcr the rebuilding bid would apply in Arizona.
~ver raised by the Nickles.

Neither was

Moreover, the evidence of the

µroximity of the business to Deseret Industries served no
purpose other than to suggest that the Nickles purchased
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their furniture there.

This was total speculalinn, wilh

no redeeming, probative value.
The irrelevant testimony on accelerants other thcrn
acetone had only one purpose - to confuse the jury on what
caused the fire.

The State advanced a theory of a device

coupled with the use of acetone as an accelerant.
was not viable.

The additional evidence of other accelerants

was designed only to obfuscate the real issue as to whether

t~

State had met its burden of proving arson.
Each time the trial court admitted this type of irrelevant evidence, the chances for a fair trial were eliminated.
At a minimum, the cumulative effect of all of this testimon1·
warrants a finding of abuse of discretion.
B.

HEARSAY

Inadmissible hearsay prejudiced the appellants at tria'.
The trial court permitted Jerry Taylor, an expert on explosivcz,
to testify to what a County Attorney's office investigator tole
him about the nature of the explosion and fire

(T. 1062).

The mere statement that an out-of-court declaration is
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted cannot be used
to circumvent the exclusion of hearsay evidence.
of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982)

In In re Est2'.:

this Court held that a state·

ment by the deceased favorable to the interest of her brother
and made to another brother was inadmissible hearsay Id. at
1117.
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:,l though f ir:ding it to be harmless error in that case, the Court
stated that the testimony that the deceased's brother had
contributed money to buy

her household items was offered for

factual support of the theory that there was an on-going
fiduciary relationship.

The respondent had argued that the

statement showed a pattern and was not offered for the truth
of whether it had been given to the deceased.
In this case, Taylor's testimony regarding investigator's
information on the circumstances and cause of the fire and
explosion was offered for the truth of the matter.

This

information was the basis for further testing by Taylor

(T. 1062).

Those facts had to be true in order for Taylor's

subsequent testing to be valid.

By allowing the evidence to

come in as hearsay, defense counsel could not cross-examine the
accuracy of the basis for Taylor's expert testimony.
C.

6

LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at the
time required that the witness have personal knowledge of or
expertise on the subject as a prerequisite to testimony.
State v. Jones, 656 P.2d 1012

In

(Utah 1982) this Court affirmed

the trial court's exclusion of testimony by a deputy county
attorney that the crime charged fit the modus operandi of
someone other than the defendant on the grounds that the attorney
lacked any personal knowledge of the matter.

In State v. Lamorie,

,11 thoucrh the revised Utah Rules of Evidence might allow
such testi~ony in as a basis for the expert's opinion, former
Rule 56 did not.
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610 P.2d 342,

345 (Utah 1980), this Court h'cld inadrnissibl'.'

Colorado court records of the defendant's prior conv1ct1on
on the grounds that the witness had no personal knowledge of
the docu.'Tients.
In this case, the vice-president of the corporation the
runs the Carriage House furniture store was allowed to testif·
that the records of the store did not show a particular sale
to the Nickles (T. 1385).

He had no direct knowledae of the

records and no foundation was laid for the information to come
in through the business record exception to hearsay.

7

The

appellants were denied adeuqate confrontation of the evidence
by this hearsay.
D.

FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE

Numerous objections were made and overruled at trial
when witnesses were asked questions which assumed facts not
in evidence. The general principle that such questions are not
appropriate has been voiced by both the Wyoming and Oregon
courts.

In DeBaca v. State, 404 P.2d 738

(Wyoming 1965), the

court found no prejudicial error in allowing such questions i:that case, but restated the basis precept that it as inaripropnc·
to ask a question on direct examination "•1,hich assumes

erroneo~·

that a material fact in issue has been ?roved.
quoting from 4 Jones, Evidence, p. 1685 (5 ed.)

The harm in

such questions is both that it suggests the answer to the wit·
7.
Defense counsel moved to strike the testimony.
The L:-ial c
took the motion under advisement but apparently never ruled.
was also no admonishment to the jury.
It is clec.r that this '""'
hearsay.
-'10-

Jnd th:it it may be misleading.

171

~'J,

(Oregon 1967).

State v. Helmick, 423 P.2d

In Helmick, the court criticized the

,nal court for stating there was "nothing wrong" with a
JL1est1on which assumed an assault had occurred (in an assault
"'1 ith

intent to commit rape case), but found no error where

the witness had previously testified to the actions constituting
the :issault.
There were six major objections during the Nickles' trial
to questions assuming facts not in evidence.

Each one alone,

and in combination, prejudiced the appellants either by suggesting
an answer or misleading the witness and the jury.
A question asked of a friend of the Nickles regarding
acetone being in suitcases was designed only for its prejudicial
effect.

The State asked Lynette Daniels if the Nickles had

ever spilled acetone in their suitcases (T. 288).

At that point,

there had been no evidence introduced of acetone in any suitcases.
It was also misleading in that subsequent testimony indicated a

small quantity of acetone, possibly from the glue in the

~ery

suitcases (T. 1535-36).
,\ question asked about "backup" devices to cause an
explosion was total specualtion by the prosecutor.
~sked

had

The prosecutor

his own expert if he had ever seen incendiary devices that

been used as backup devices (T. 1148).

Not one shred of

'""dence prior to this point or subsequent was introduced to
show a backup device.

This

question clearly was misleading and

confusing, designed only to speculate where there was no evidence.
The State questioned a witness regarding what she had
said to Richard Nickles on the telephone when there was no
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evidence that he was the caller (T. 1269).

She had C'.lcrc::l·/

testified that the caller purported to be Richard
(T. 1267-68).

~icklcs

The prosecutor's assur.1ption that the caller

was the appellant usurped the jury's function in determining
that issue and was confusing in allowing a fact to be stated
by the prosecutor that was not evidence.
The State was allowed to question a witness from a
retail furniture store regarding a purchase by the Nickles
despite the fact that the appellants never claimed to have
purchased the furniture at the store.

Although originally

sustaining the objection (T. 1375), the trial court

subsequentl~

permitted a question as to whether the I'ickles had purchased a
dresser from Carria<Je House (T. 13 7 9) .

As explained re pea tedl~

throu0hout the trial, the appellants used stores such as the
Carriage House to obtain replacement costs and were not representing that they had purchased the item there

(T. 1179, 1849).

The State's sole purpose here was to mislead the jury into
thinking that the Nickles were deceptive on their insurance
claim since they had not purchased the dresser at the store
listed.
The State then questioned a witness, who had hung
draperies for the Nickles, as to whether such draperies could
be modified for a new home

(T. 1724).

This question assumed

that the Nickles intended to take the draperies to a new houE
The State had presented no such evidence.

It is clear thLlt th'

prosecutor asked this question in order to suggest to the jur;
that the Nickles had removed the draperies from the house prior
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t0

the fire.

Lu

i~ntroduce

The State had no such evidence and, yet, was able
the idea through innuendo.

The prosecutor asked a question about a claim on the
1roof of loss of use for a trailer used in Arizona (T. 1765-66).
The appellants are unable to find such an item in the proof of
loss of use.
su~gest

The purpose of the prosecutor was undoubtedly to

that the Nickles had inappropriately claimed relocation

expenses for their parents in Arizona.

There was no such fact

in evidence and the effect on the jury could only have been
prejudicial to the Nickles.
Each of the foregoing questions permitted evidence
prejudicial to the appellants to be admitted.

These were not

situations, as in State v. Helmick, supra, where the witness
had already testified to the facts that were then assumed in
the question under different wording.
~rosecutor

In each instance, the

used facts never placed into evidence.

The goal of

the prosecutor was attained; he introduced speculation for
consideration by the jury without any evidence to support such
allegations.
E.

EVIDENCE BEYOND THE WITNESS' EXPERTISE

At three points during the trial, defense counsel objected
to cuestions calling for answers outside the witness' expertise.
-nunty Attorney investigator Olin Yearby testified about sources of
'''nit ion

(T.

388-89).

Aaron .l\lma Nelson, the attorney for the

insurance COQpany, testified regarding what the insurance policy
"1ould cover (T. 1168).

Iraj Aalam of Sunglo Energy Systems, Inc.,

called by the defense as an expert in heat loss analysis, was
forced to answer a question on fuel-air explosions (T. 1609) ·
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Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of C','1dc,nc0,

:r

effect at the time of trial, an expert witness could tcstif
in the form of an opinion if the basis for the opinion w;E
known to the witness and "within the scope of the special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training" of the witness.
The purpose of qualifying an expert is to be sure that the
question will be answered by a person who is qualified to
answer it.

2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Co=on Law, EiSSS

(3d. ed. 1979).

The witness :nust, as \'ligmore stated, be fit

to answer on that point. Id.

This Court, in Park v.

Farns1-1ort~,

622 P. 2d 788, 790 (Utah 1980), found the trial court had not
erred by excluding testimony of a witness called to interpret
field notes of a survey because he had neither expertise nor
personal knowledge of the survey.
The rationale of Park v. Farnsworth applies to this

c~s,

Olin Yearby was trained in processing crime scenes and had
received training in arson cases (T. 369).

f{owever,

there was

no foundation as to what training provided him with expertise
on sources of ignition.

By allowing his answer in, the tr1a:

court erroneously allowed the Jury to perceive the witness
as someone who was fit to conclude that there were no heat
sources in the house.
was permitted to

This same prejudice arose when the atto'

testif~·

as to policy coverage ciithout dernonstc

personal knowledge or expertise in policj• covera')e.

i\lthouc~:.

perhaps unusual to object to the lack of expertise of a defens
witness, Mr. Aalam was qualified only in heat loss anal;s1s.
The State, by its questioning a fuel-air explosion, was tr:in1
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t.c' rcsL1tc its cilsc throu']h an inappropriate witness.

In

"·\·, instilnce, the witness was not qualified to answer the

,,u_ st ion ilS ked.
1_)

The danger of presenting erroneous information

th,c jury was present.

The trial court erred in permitting

this testimony.
F.

SPECULATION

It is inappropriate and prejudicial to ask a question
which calls for a sceculative answer.

Although the appellants

hJ.'.'e found no cases directly on point, according to l'/igmore
an opinion which is a mere guess is inadmissible because a
witness must have both the mental power or capacity to acquire
in the subject of testimony as well as intelligence

~nowledge

uoon the subject of testimony.
at Common Law, §651

2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials

(3d. ed. 1979).

Thus experience and

::nowledge provide the ground rules for testimony rather than
speculation and conclusion. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
~:1dence

concept
0•

the

in effect at the time of the trial embraces this
b~

requiring the witness to have personal knowledge

su~ject

of the testimony.

There were four major times

Jur1ng the trial of the appellants where speculative answers
·1cr2 admitted over the objection of defense counsel.

A loan officer was asked whether anything would have
·r0r~u~cd someone from removing furniture from the house after

ti:,·.

lc•iln but before the fire

(T. 463).

This question was clearly

,;, signed to imply that furniture had in fact been removed when
there was no such evidence to support the allegation.
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An explosives expert was asked to speculate whether
simulated explosion experiments would

~e

more complicated

by wind coming through a flue in the furnace or fireplace than
by a broken window (T. 1098).

Here the prosecutor v.'os tryir.c;

to bolster the State's ineffective experiments by conjecture.
David Osborne, a chemist called by the defense, was
asked whether someone in the boat business would have acetone
in a large quantity (T. 1544).

There had been no evidence that

the Nickles had any recent involvement in the boat business.
The State was attempting to suggest a source for the acetone
which was without any evidentiary foundation.
The appellants also objected as speculation to a
question whether it would be possible to modify the draperies
in the

~ickles'

home to be used in another house as calling for

a speculative answer (T. 1724).

This question was discussed

infra at 42-43 as it also assumed a fact not in evidence.
The State was trying to imply that the Nickles had removed the
draperies prior to the fire without any basis for such an
allegation.
The speculative evidence pen:iitted here by itself, but
especially coupled with the evidence introduced by questions
assuming facts not in evidence (see infra at 40-43), constitutes
prejudicial error.

The only goal of the prosecutor was to

introduce facts for which he had no real support.
permitted to engage in guesswork with this evidence.
verdict was not based on admissible evidence.

Their

G.

NON-RESPmJSIVE ANS\'lER

During the trial, the State's expert, Jerry Taylor,
oiuntecred that he had read about flammable liquids in
~cneral

(T. 1099).

Lhe ouestion asked.

This response was totally unresponsive to
The witness was asked whether an air

source such as an open flue would complicate an experiment with
the so-called "device" any more than a broken window (T. 1098).
The court had just overruled the defense objection made on the
grounds of speculation when the witness volunteered that he
had read about the characteristics of flammable liquids in
general

(T. 1099).
Although a non-responsive answer may stand if it is

otherwise competent, Peoole v. Wong Chuey, 117 Cal. 624, 49
P. 833 (1897), there is great prejudice in irrelevant and
otherwise inadmissible volunteered statements.
by the State's expert was gratuitous.

The statement

It implied an expertise

on the specific tests and substances in this case from merely
re,1ding about the general characteristics of flammable liquids.
The court should have granted the motion to strike.
H.
~t

ARGUMENTATIVE QUESTIONS

several points during the trial, the prosecutor

o•·erstepped the bounds of appropriate questioning by asking
1r1umentative questions.
'h~

The only prupose was to prejudice

Jury against the appellants.
Although the appellants have found no Utah cases

s~eci:ically on argumentative questions,
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the rationale of cases

balancing the prejudicial effect
probative value would apply here.

Of

the

e•1idem~,,

,Hp

inst its

Rule 45 of the_' llL'th !<ules

of Evidence, in effect at the time of the trial, prnv1des that
court has discretion to exclude evidence if the preJudicial
effect outweighs the probative value.

In Reiser v. Lohner,

~'

this Court sustained the trial court's exclusion of possijly
negligent collateral medical test as irrelevant and

potential!~

prejudicial evidence under Rule 45 where it did not affect the
malpractice claim at issue. The same reasoning applied L1 :!art1·
Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, where this Court noted the addi ticn2:
dangers of confusin0 or misleading the jury, sustaining the tri2_
court's exclusion of

we2~~er

conditions

twe~ty

miles 3way.

At one point, a witness was asked whether the insurancE
co~pany's

attorney and defense counsel were at the scene of the

fire as a result of a Motion to Compel Discovery 0y the a;:ipellu;.t:
The prosecutor had to know the existence of the motion was
irrelevant.

The question was raised purely for its prejudicia,

effect in implying that the appellants were litigious.

8

In another instance, a defense witness, who had an
expertise in air exchange, was questioned about changing
quantities of acetone and the possibility of fuel-air explosions
(T. 1609).

The purpose was simply to imply that the witness he3

no expertise.

Such an irrelevant line of questioning

unfairl~

prejudiced the credibility of this witness.
The prosecutor next tackled Kin Nickles, the daughter

r·

the appellants, asking whether she had thrown her porn-porns over
8. The witness responded that he did not know.
The trial cour:
allowed it to stand because the -:inswer was alread'.· in, but faile:
to admonish the jury to disreoard the answer.
-43-

th

neighbors'

fence when it was clear the explosion had carried

eiJe

uom-poms to where they were found
0adgering the witness.

c~

th~

(T. 1814).

This bordered

It was clearly designed to attack

appellants case in an improper manner.
The prosecutor also used this technique with his own

witness.

Glenn Barnrnerlin, an insurance adjuster, was asked

if he had told the Nickles they could claim items on their
croof of loss that they had not had in their house (T. 2050).
It is obvious that the prosecutor used this question to imply
that the Nickles had in fact claimed items which they never
had in their home.

This baseless question could serve only to

orejudice the jury; there was no probative worth to the question.

Each inadmissible statement, as well as the cumulative
impact, created reversible error in this case.

Although we

cannot know what evidence the jury considered in reading its
vercict, the amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted
in this case cannot be ignored.

The jury was bombarded by it.

The cumulative effect, if not the individual errors,
~arrants

a new trial.

(nkl. Crim.

In Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250

App. 1980), the court stated:

When a review of the entire record reveals
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice the rights of a defendant and where
an accumulation of errors denies a defendant
a fair trial, the case will be reversed, even
though one of the errors, standing alone, would
not be ample to justify reversal.
,~oodon,

the court reversed where there was prosecutorial

,, sconduct in cross-examination and closing a:cgument.
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The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case
cannot be quantified.

Nevertheless, no Juror could have

ignored all of the inadmissible evidence.

Hearsay,

irrelevant

evidence, prejudicial facts not in evidence, speculations,
opinions outside an expert's area, facts of which witnesses
had no direct knowledge, and inflammatory argumentative
questions were erroneously permitted.

The appellants are

entitled to a new trial
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT A CONVICTION ON INSURANCE FRAUD
NECESSITATED MORE THAN INACCURATE ESTI!!ATES.
The appellants requested that the court instruct the
jury on the definition of an estimate and also that insurance
fraud involved more than an error in estimation.

They submitteC

an instruction which defined "estimate" as "an opinion, a
rough or approximate calculation of the cost of an item."
was given in Instruction No. 19.

This

The appellants also requested,

however, that the court include, as an element to be proved,

t~2:

on the proof of loss "said submissions were :nore than 'esti:-.at22
Defendant's proposed Instruction No. 14.

The court refused to

give this part of the instruction and the appellants to ol: e::c2:
to it (T. 2091).
This Court has addressed the issue of appropriately
instructing the jury.

In Penelko, Inc. v. John Price ;\ssocicite2.

Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982), in a civil suit involving
damages between a lessor and lessee, the Court found no error
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the instructions on damages, but noted:
The purpose of jury instructions is to
inform the jury of applicable law in terms
that they can readily understand.
Id. at 1234.

In a criminal context, the Court has reversed where

the jury instructions impermissibly created the possiblity of
interpreting a presumption as conclusive.
6~G

P. 2d 639

State v. Walton,

(Utah 1982).

The possibility of incorrectly interpreting the court's
instructions occurred in this case by the failure to give the
requested instruction.

The court apparently agreed that the

distinction between an estimate and insurance fraud was
significant as it instructed the jury on the definition of
"estimate."

The definition by itself, however, left a void

as to what the jury should do if they found that any errors in
the proof of loss were due to estimates.

Without the requested

clarification that insurance fraud required more than mere
errors in estimation, the jury may well have found the appellants
~uilty

without sufficient evidence of criminal conduct.

The

instructions as given, even when taken as a whole, were
misleading on this issue. ''/here it cannot be determined whether
the jury decided the case on an impermissible basis, the Court
should reverse and order a new trial as in State v. Walton, supra.
CONCLUSION
The appellants' convictions should be reversed.

The

e"1dcncc introduced at trial was insufficient to connect either
·· th~ 3ppellants to the cause of the fire or to prove an intent
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to defraud on the insurance claim.
by the erroneous admission of the contents of a
allegedly made by Mr. Nickles.

The lack

o~

t~lcphone

call

an impartial

prosecutor denied the appellants a fair trial.

The multitude

of evidence erroneously admitted also abrogated the appellants'
right to a fair trial.

And finally,

the jury should have been

instructed on the distinction between inaccurate estimates and
insurance fraud.

For all of these reasons, the resulting

convictions should be reversed and a new trial should be
ordered.
RESPECTFULLY

19 84.

Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appell;·
to the Attorney General's Off ice, 2 36 State Capitol Bui ldin<J, sa;·
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day of September, 1984.
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